Expositor, trying to present and clarify the main points of a certain view of contextuality.
Interlocutor: My dear Expositor, I always find an informal presentation of ideas a dubious exercise. If I do not understand the presentation clearly (which happens often), it is never clear to me whether this is because it was dumbed down so much as to become deficient of information, or because the ideas themselves are deficient. Nevertheless I should let you proceed.
Exp: Let me try. Objects (or things, or properties -choose what you like) are measured under varying conditions, called contexts. The measurements are generally random variables, and their identity is defined by what is measured (object) and under what conditions it is measured (context). As a result, the same object measured in different contexts is represented by different random variables: it is meaningless to ask why they are different (hence the designation "contextuality-by-default"). Moreover, measurements made in different contexts, whether of the same object or of different objects, do not have a joint distribution. One cannot, e.g., speak of their correlation or of the probability with which they have the same value. All measurements made within one and the same context, however, are jointly distributed.
The overall picture we have therefore is one of stochastically unrelated to each other islands of jointly distributed measurements ("bunches of random variables"). Is this sufficiently clear?
Int: I am not sure. How does one define "objects" and "contexts"?
Exp: Primitives of a theory cannot be explained conceptually except in their relations to other primitives of the theory, and their operational meaning may be outside the theory. The "objects" and "contexts" are such primitives: formally, they are no more than labels defining the identity of a measurement (so that each measurement is defined by two labels, one for "what" and another for "in what context").
Int: Perhaps we could clarify this with examples.
Exp: Here is an example. Suppose we pose two Yes/No questions to randomly chosen people and record their responses. The questions can be asked verbally or presented in writing. Intuitively, a question asked is the "object" being measured, the presentation mode (verbal or written) is context, and the response to a given question by a randomly chosen person is measurement, a random variable labeled by the question asked and by its presentation mode.
Int: So we have four random variables, if I understood you correctly: response to question A presented verbally, response to question A presented in writing, and analogously for the second question, B.
Exp: Yes. Let me suggest notation for these four random variables: Exp: It is clear that for each of our four variables we have well-defined probabilities with which their value is Yes: this is the probability with which a randomly chosen person will respond Yes to the corresponding question in the corresponding context. Say, the probability of the event R V A = Yes is 0.4, the probability of R V B = Yes is 0.5, and for R W B = Yes the probability is, say, 0.7. All these probabilities are well-defined theoretically and can be estimated empirically. Since we ask A and B in the verbal mode together (from a same person), we can also define and estimate the joint probability of R Exp: No combinations of objects and contexts can contradict our general rules because these combinations have to be chosen in accordance with these rules. In your modified set-up, if we continue to view the questions A and B as our sole and distinct objects, then the contexts involve not only the mode of presentation but also the identity of the questions themselves: (A, V ), (B, W ), etc. So the random variables we record are
Since no two of them share a context, they are pairwise stochastically unrelated.
Int: But how do I know which of the representations to use, R
Exp: First you have to decide (outside the CbD theory) on the empirical meaning of "co-occurrence" or "occurrence together" in your study. In our examples you consider questions posed to one and the same person (and responses obtained from one and the same person) as co-occurring. You also know the rules, so you always use different contexts, whatever your choice of the labels for them, for the measurements that do not co-occur. Suppose I simplify your design by forgetting about the presentation modes. I ask one of two questions, A or B, of randomly chosen people. The objects being measured then are A and B again, and we know that the measurements of these objects never co-occur, hence they are stochastically unrelated. Therefore the questions themselves (or any two labels corresponding to them one-to-one) are the contexts here,
Int: I think I now understand the notion of stochastic unrelatedness and your notation. But couldn't we also say in all such cases that the two random variables, e.g., R
A A , R B B , are stochastically independent? Exp: This would be a common way of thinking of this situation. But it is incorrect. One could only say, with some caution, that they can always be treated as if they were independent. We will get to this later, when we consider the notion of a coupling. You can, however, appreciate the difference between the situation when a randomly chosen person is being asked one of two questions, A or B, and the situation when a randomly chosen person is being asked both these questions, A and B. The two responses in the latter case are random variables
jointly distributed: one can define and estimate the probability of the joint event R Int: I see the difference. I still have questions about the objects and contexts, but I think I should allow you to continue your presentation of CbD. The double-notation, I understand, is only a departure point.
Exp: Yes, it is. And we will indeed continue to address your misgivings as we proceed. By now we have established a certain picture of a system of measurements: it consists of stochastically unrelated to each other islands (or bunches) of jointly distributed random variables. The main idea of CbD is that these isolated bunches can be characterized by exploring all possible couplings thereof ( or all possible joint distributions imposable on them) under well-chosen constraints.
Int: What is a coupling?
Exp: A coupling for stochastically unrelated random variables X, Y, . . . , Z is a jointly distributed X, Y , . . . , Z in which X has the same distribution as X, Y has the same distribution as Y , and so on. It can be shown that this probability can have any value from 0.1 (maximally negative relation) to 0.4 (maximally positive relation). The independent coupling, with this probability equal to 0.4 × 0.7, is within this range. Int: Let me try an example with continuous distributions. Take random variables R and S that are standard normally distributed. Then any bivariate normally distributed R, S with standard normal marginals is a coupling of R and S.
Exp: Yes, and there are other couplings for these R and S too: it can be any R, S whose joint distribution is well-defined, and whose individual (marginal) distributions are standard normal.
Int: Just so that we don't focus on pairs of random variables exclusively, what would be a coupling for the four random variables R 
with the probabilities summing to 1, of course. And the joint distribution of
is determined analogously,
To couple these pairs (equivalently, to couple all four random variables
with jointly distributed components such that the distributions of the pairs R 
To form a coupling, these probabilities should agree with the observed p and q values: e.g., i,j∈{Yes,No}
Int: And, of course, this can generally be done in an infinite number of ways. I think it is clear. You said earlier that you wanted to characterize the isolated bunches of random variables by exploring all possible couplings of these bunches under well-chosen constraints.
Tell me now what you mean by the "well-chosen constraints" for couplings.
Exp: The "well-chosen constraints" depend on (and determine) the aspect of the system of unrelated to each other bunches you want to characterize. If we are interested in contextuality, the idea (arguably, the most original idea in the CbD approach) is to look for couplings in which the measurements of one and the same object under different conditions are equal to each other with as high a probability as possible. Contextuality is determined by computing these highest probabilities for each object in isolation and then determining if they are compatible with the observed bunches of measurements.
Int: I assume you want to elaborate.
Exp: I will. But I think we will relegate this to our next conversation.
Conversation 2
Exp: My dear Interlocutor, you asked me to elaborate what I said about the measurements of an object in different contexts being equal to each other with as high a probability as possible. First of all, let me emphasize that the probability of being equal to each other applies to the couplings rather than the coupled random variables themselves. When I find a bivariate-normally distributed coupling R, S for standard normally distributed R and S, I do not make R and S jointly distributed, I merely create jointly distributed "copies" of R and S. And there are generally an infinite set of such couplings. Among them there is one coupling, with the correlation between R and S equal to 1 (defining a degenerate bivariate-normal distribution), in which Pr R = S has the highest possible value (in this case, 1). It is called a maximal coupling. If R and S are normally distributed but with different means and/or variances, then the maximal couplings still exist, but not among bivariate normally distributed R, S , and the highest possible probability for R = S is less than 1.
Int: Let me switch back to our original example to understand this. In R 
How does one proceed from here?
Exp: Now we have to take all four our random variables and construct a cou-
for them. We have already discussed how we do this. Except in special cases, there is an infinity of such couplings. What we are now interested in is whether among all these couplings there is at least one in which Pr
If the answer to this question is affirmative, then we say that the system of measurements, in this case comprised of R Exp: This is definitely a possible approach. I have mentioned already that objects and contexts are primitives of the CbD theory, which means that the theory does not dictate their choice. The only constraint imposed by the theory is that the random variables measured in the same context have a joint distribution, while random variables in different contexts do not. If you choose a single object in two contexts, as you have proposed, you will simply be dealing with a different problem. The system comprised of R V (A,B) and R W (A,B) may or may not be inconsistently connected (I suggest we stick to this term instead of "contextuality-1" and the like), but irrespective of this, it is noncontextual. If it is inconsistently connected, then the system we considered previously, R can be shown to be noncontextual if and only if
where · is expected value.
6 You can easily verify that this inequality may hold or fail with the distributions of R V (A,B) and R W (A,B) being different. Int: I wonder: even if we get a completely different system by doing this, is it always possible to get rid of contextuality in the sense of CbD by redefining the objects?
Exp: The answer to this is yes, but generally not by grouping the objects together, as in R
. Consider, e.g., a system involving three objects q, q ′ , q ′′ and three contexts c, c ′ , c ′′ , combined in the measurements as follows:
As always, the pairs of random variables labeled by the same context are jointly distributed, and different pairs are stochastically unrelated. One cannot now put all three objects together as a single object. Instead one can do something universally applicable: taking a measurement's context as part of the identity of the measurement's object. In our case this means replacing q in R c q with (q, c), replacing q in R c ′′ q with (q, c ′′ ), etc. We will get then in place of the system above a new system
In this system no two measurements share their object, and the system is readily seen as trivially noncontextual (and also consistently connected, again in the trivial sense).
Int:
This universal trick then consists in declaring any object in a new context to be a new object. For instance, a question presented verbally and the same (in content) question presented in writing are different questions.
Exp: Yes, and there is nothing incorrect about this, at least not from the point of view of CbD. It just makes the issue of contextuality uninteresting.
Int: So we will not use this trick for the sake of keeping our discussion interesting. However, philosophically speaking, it may very well be the case that finding a system of measurements contextual means that "the same" objects in different contexts are not really the same.
Exp: Perhaps. But I find such philosophical formulations unsatisfactory. We need a language rich enough to lead to interesting classifications and quantifications of contextuality. The language of CbD is rich enough. Trivial renaming of all objects into object-contexts is not.
Int: I agree. I think I understand the definition of contextuality in CbD. However, I may need more persuasion to accept it. Let me return to my misgivings about "contextuality-1" and "contextuality-2." Why do we need the latter?
Exp: Let me remind to you that "contextuality-1" is inconsistent connectedness: for some objects, their measurements have different distributions in different contexts. We may very well have a consistently connected system, however, without "contextuality-1." Will we simply declare it noncontextual since all contextuality is "contextuality-1"? Again, one can say this if one so wishes, but this terminology will not change the fact that there is an important distinction within the class of consistently connected systems of measurements.
Int: Please remind me what this distinction is.
Exp: If the distribution of the measurements of a given object is the same across all contexts involving this object, then it is possible to couple these measurements so that their copies in the coupling are equal to each other with probability 1. Let's call this the identity coupling. Now, there are two possibilities. There can be a consistently connected system that has a coupling in which this probability 1 is achieved for all objects; in other words the identity couplings for different objects can all be put together so that they are compatible with the observed distributions of the bunches of measurements in each of the contexts. And there can be systems in which such couplings do not exist: the observed bunches of measurements are not compatible with the identity couplings for all the objects. This is an important distinction, and it is captured by calling the systems of the latter kind contextual. In quantum physics this distinction is related to such questions as the (non)existence of hidden variables of which all observed random variables in an experiment are functions.
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Int: Yes, I agree this distinction is important. But it seems to me in quantum physics the case of consistent connectedness is the main if not the only case to consider. 9 If we retain the traditional definition of contextuality for such systems (perhaps in the CbD formulation), do we need to extend it to inconsistent connectedness? You said the contextuality in the sense of CbD exists "on top of" inconsistent connectedness. Couldn't we, however, simply ignore it? In other words, couldn't we have a single notion of contextuality, which coincides with "contextuality-2" for consistently connected systems and with "contextuality-1" otherwise? I have almost asked this question before, but we digressed (or at least I see it now as a digression) into the discussion of how one can define objects and contexts.
Exp: Let me think of how to respond to this, and we will return to this in our next conversation.
Conversation 3
Exp: My dear Interlocutor, to defend a definition is a difficult task. A good definition of a term should be intuitively plausible (although sometimes one's intuition itself should be "educated" to make it plausible), it should include as special cases all examples and situations that are traditionally considered to fall within the scope of the term, it should lead to productive development (to allow one to prove nontrivial theorems), and have a growing set of applications. I believe contextuality in the sense of CbD satisfies all these desiderata, but I may be unable to discuss them with you comprehensively.
Int: Let us try intuitive plausibility.
Exp: One argument I find persuasive is appealing to "small" inconsistencies added to consistently connected systems with "large" contextuality. Contextuality in CbD can be rigorously quantified, 10 but I will only need intuitive guidance to present the argument. Consider our system R
You may recall that the criterion (necessary and sufficient condition) for noncontextuality here is given by the inequality
8 Aut: This is, e.g., how the problem was formulated by Bell (1964) . The possibility of reformulating this in terms of the (non)existence of certain couplings (without using this concept explicitly) was realized later, in Suppes and Zanotti (1981) and Fine (1982) .
9 Aut: It may be a prevalent case but definitely not the only one: see, e.g., Bacciagaluppi (2015).
10 Aut: See Dzhafarov et al. (2015a) ; ; ; de Barros et al. (2015) .
Your proposal is to accept this formula only for consistently connected systems, when
In this case the system is contextual if and only if
Now, the largest possible value of the last expression is 2, and, I think you would agree, it is reasonable to say that the system R with this value equal to 2 exhibits the greatest possible degree of contextuality, given the consistent connectedness.
Int: Is this maximum value 2 compatible with consistent connectedness?
Exp: Yes, it is. See these two distributions: The only difference of this system from the previous one is that now R V A = 2ε rather than 0 and R V A R V B = 1 − 2ε rather than 1; but ε can be chosen arbitrarily small. The system therefore can be made arbitrarily close to the previous one. If I continue to follow your proposal, however, I should abandon the joint expectations altogether and focus on the marginals only: the system is contextual now simply because it is inconsistently connected,
But you would probably agree that if ε is minuscule, the degree of contextuality in the system is minuscule too, wouldn't you?
Int: Indeed I would. And I can guess the rest of your argument too. When ε is very small but nonzero, the system has a small degree of contextuality (which will be "contextuality-1"). As you make ε smaller and smaller, the contextuality gets smaller and smaller. But as soon as ε reaches zero, the contextuality jumps from the limiting zero value to the maximal possible value (because now it is "contextuality-2"). It is a strange behavior, I should admit.
Exp: Precisely. I conclude that your concept of contextuality is not well-formed. If we distinguish inconsistent connectedness from contextuality in accordance with CbD, however, the problem disappears. The degree of contextuality in the second system, if ε is very small, is only slightly smaller than the degree of contextuality in the first system. The inequality
Int: I agree this feature speaks in favor of the CbD concept. Does this mean, however, that inconsistent connectedness and contextuality (or "contextuality-1" and "contextuality-2," even if you don't like this terminology) have fundamentally different ontologies?
Exp: It is a question to which I do not have a definitive answer. Inconsistent connectedness in most, if not all cases have trivial and well-understood causes: conditions under which measurements are made affect these measurements, either through physical interference or through context-dependent measurement biases. In the example with written and verbal questions, reading a question invokes very different psychological processes than hearing it asked: there is nothing remarkable in the distributions of responses in the two cases being different. Or consider a formally identical but empirically different example: replace the presentation mode with order in which the two questions are asked, so that instead of V we have context A → B and instead of W the context B → A. In this case it is natural to expect that the first question affects a person's response to the second question. 11 In physics, it is common that different contexts correspond to different experimental set-ups, so that one and the same object in different contexts is simply measured differently.
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Int: And you claim that the causes for contextuality are different?
Exp: At least they may be different, and they are definitely different in some cases. Take the famous Alice-Bob experiment (more formally known as the EPR/Bohm or EPR/Bell paradigm), in which Alice measures spins in a particle 1 and Bob measures spins in a particle 2. The two particles are entangled, meaning that they were created in a special, singular state that makes Alice's and Bob's spins that are measured in the opposite directions perfectly correlated. Alice and Bob make their measurements simultaneously from some Charlie's point of view, and this precludes any information traveling from Alice to Bob or vice versa. Nevertheless, we have a clear case of contextuality ("contextuality-2") in this case.
13 If we modify this experiment so that Alice and Bob (from Charlie's point of view) make their measurement with an interval between them that allows for signaling, and if we assume that some form of signaling is indeed effected, then we may have distributions of Alice's measurement depending on Bob's settings and/or vice versa. This would be inconsistent connectedness. But contextuality may still be measurable "on top of" this inconsistency. Exp: I could summarize the definition of contextuality in a more formal way. I recall you did not like informal presentations.
Int: Please do.
Exp: The primitive concepts of the theory are 16 1. set Q of "objects being measured,"
2. set C of "contexts of measurements," 3. relation "object q is measured in context c," q c, and 4. set of "measurements," random variables R = R for every q ∈ Q. If R has a maximally connected coupling it is noncontextual. If R does not have a maximally connected coupling it is contextual.
Int: Do we know criteria of (non)contextuality analogous to the one you mentioned before, for the system R 
